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iv 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Eric LaGrande Houser appeals from the district court's appellate decision 
affirming his judgment of conviction upon a jury's verdict that he is guilty of 
misdemeanor battery. Houser challenges the district court's findings that the 
magistrate's rulings on motions in limine were proper, and that the prosecutor did 
not commit misconduct. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged Houser with misdemeanor battery against Gregory 
Manning, a registered nurse at Kootenai Medical Center (the hospital) who was 
providing care to Houser at the time of the incident. (R., pp. 11, 25.) Houser 
had been transported to Kootenai Medical Center after overdosing on 
methamphetamine. (R., p. 219.) In preparing Houser for discharge, Manning 
helped Houser put on his socks. (R., pp. 219-20.) Manning started putting 
Hauser's shoe on, when Houser "kicked up" at Manning, swearing about blisters 
on his feet, then threw the second shoe at Manning. (Tr., p. 97, Ls. 6-21.) 
Manning testified he apologized, putting his hands up, but Houser "slid over and 
struck me in the face." (Tr., p. 97, Ls. 22-25.) Manning told Houser to calm 
down, but Houser "took another swing," then "rolled back on the bed and started 
kickin' at [him]." (Tr., p. 98, Ls. 1-3.) 
Manning called out "Code Gray," indicating a need for assistance to 
control a patient. (R., p. 220.) Another registered nurse, Craig Spoon, 
responded and helped restrain Houser. (R., p. 220.) Shortly after the 
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altercation, police officer John Kelly video-recorded a brief interview with Houser 
in which Houser explained, Manning "was puttin' on my shoe and he caught a 
blister. He didn't know it was down there, and I yelled and it scared him and [he] 
came at me." (Tr., p. 189, Ls. 10-13.) Houser told the officer he did not 
specifically remember hitting or kicking Manning. (Tr., p. 191, Ls. 5-8.) At trial, 
Houser denied that he hit or kicked Manning. (Tr., p. 263, L. 18 - p. 264, L. 5.) 
Prior to trial, Houser moved to exclude evidence of his drug-use. (R., pp. 
27-30.) The state moved to exclude evidence related to the hospital's Code 
Gray policy, and evidence of an employment issue involving Manning from three 
years prior. (R., pp. 36-39.) The magistrate court granted Hauser's motion to 
exclude evidence of past drug-use, but denied the motion as to use that may 
explain Hauser's behavior at the time of the incident. (R., pp. 34-35; Tr., p. 7, L. 
14 - p. 8, L. 5.) As to the state's motions in limine, the magistrate court ruled 
that evidence of Manning's past employment issue - a self-reported 
misadministration of a patient's medication - was irrelevant, and excluded it as 
improper impeachment. (R., pp. 38, 76; Tr., p. 51, Ls. 18-22; Tr., p. 54, L. 22-
p. 55, L. 5.) The magistrate court also ruled that evidence explaining what Code 
Gray is and its "general parameters" was admissible, but he would not allow "a 
trial on whether or not [Manning]" should have been disciplined for violation of 
the policy. (R., p. 77; Tr., p. 62, Ls. 3-20.) 
At trial, Manning testified with his right arm in a sling. (R., p. 221; Tr., p. 
79, L. 23 - p. 80, L. 7.) Manning testified that he injured his right shoulder in the 
incident with Houser, and that the injury was why he was wearing a sling. (Tr., p. 
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105, L. 6 - p. 106, L. 1.) Spoon also testified. (R., p. 221.) When asked if he 
could identify Manning, who was not present in the courtroom, Spoon described 
Manning as having an arm injury, as shown by his use of a sling. (Tr., p. 153, L 
10 - p. 154, L. 3.) Defense counsel objected and moved to strike, and the 
magistrate court overruled. (Tr., p. 154, Ls. 5-7.) 
The jury found Houser guilty of battery, and the magistrate court entered 
judgment. (R., pp. 126-27.) Houser appealed to the district court, challenging 
the magistrate's pretrial rulings allowing evidence of his drug-use just prior to the 
battery, and excluding evidence about Manning's past employment issue. (R., 
pp. 128-30; 140-72.) Houser also asserted prosecutorial misconduct in soliciting 
Spoon's testimony that mentioned Manning's use of a sling. (R., pp. 141-72.) 
The district court considered written and oral arguments by counsel and entered 
a Memorandum Decision and Order affirming the magistrate court's rulings and 
Hauser's judgment of conviction. (R., pp. 214-30.) Houser timely appealed. (R., 
pp. 232-35.) 
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ISSUES 
Houser states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the defendant's drug use was relevant and not 
unfairly prejudicial to the fight that occurred with the male 
nurse over putting on his shoes. 
2. Whether the fact that the male nurse violated hospital policy 
by fighting with the defendant and had previously been 
disciplined by the hospital was admissible impeachment 
evidence to show the male nurse's motive to lie about how 
the incident occurred. 
3. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by unduly 
emphasizing irrelevant evidence and incorrectly stating the 
burden of proof. 
4. Whether Perry should be modified such that in cases 
involving multiple incidents of prosecutorial misconduct that 
went without an objection from defense counsel, an 
appellate court should review all the alleged misconduct to 
determine whether a fair trial was provided. 
5. Whether the cumulative error doctrine requires the reversal 
of the defendant's conviction. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 12.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Houser failed to show error in the magistrate's determination that 
Houser's drug-use just before the incident was relevant and more 
probative than prejudicial as to whether he committed battery? 
2. Has Houser failed to show error in the magistrate's determination that 
Manning's prior self-reported misadministration of patient medication, and 
the details of the hospital's Code Gray policy were not relevant to whether 
Houser committed battery? 
3. Has Houser failed to show prosecutorial misconduct in eliciting testimony 
from a witness about Manning's appearance at trial, which testimony was, 
in any event, harmless? 
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4. Should the Court reject Houser's invitation to modify Perry because his 
unsupported miscellaneous assertions of prosecutorial misconduct are 
waived? 
5. Has Houser failed to establish error, let alone cumulative error? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Houser Has Failed To Show Error In The Magistrate's Determination That 
Hauser's Drug-use Just Before The Incident Was Relevant And More Probative 
Than Prejudicial As To Whether He Committed Battery 
A. Introduction 
Before trial, Houser moved to exclude evidence of his drug-use under 
I.RE. 404(b) and 403. (R., pp. 27-30.) The magistrate judge excluded evidence 
of Hauser's past drug-use, but ruled that drug-use that may have influenced 
Houser at the time of the alleged battery was relevant and admissible. 1 (R., pp. 
34-35; Tr., p. 7, L. 14 - p. 8, L. 5.) Houser argues this ruling was in error and 
violated his right to a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-18.) Houser's 
arguments fail because his drug-use just before the incident was relevant to 
discredit Hauser's assertions about what happened, and support that Houser 
battered Manning as charged. The record and applicable law support the 
magistrate's determination that the probative value of the evidence outweighed 
any prejudicial effect. Accordingly, this Court should affirm. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court directly reviews a decision by a district court made in 
its appellate capacity. State v. Decker, 152 Idaho 142, 145, 267 P.3d 729, 732 
(Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted). The appellate court accepts the magistrate's 
factual findings supported by substantial and competent evidence, but freely 
reviews legal conclusions. State v. Green, 149 Idaho 706, 708, 239 P.3d 811, 
1 At trial, Houser testified about "overdosing on methamphetamine" the day 
before being taken to the hospital. (Tr., p. 251, L. 22.) 
6 
813 (Ct. App. 201 0); Decker, 152 Idaho at 145, 267 P.3d at 732; Green, 149 
Idaho at 708, 239 P .3d at 813. Where the magistrate's decision is supported by 
the record and law, and where the district court affirmed, the appellate court will 
affirm "as a matter of procedure." kl 
For issues concerning admissibility of evidence, the appellate court 
applies a mixed standard of review. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 
247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010) (citation omitted). First, the appellate court freely 
reviews the legal question whether evidence is relevant. kl Next, the appellate 
court reviews for abuse of discretion, the trial court's weighing of the evidence's 
probative value against its prejudicial effect. kl For this, the appellate court 
considers whether the court below (1) understood its decision was discretionary, 
(2) acted within the scope of its discretion and consistent with applicable legal 
standards, and (3) exercised reason in reaching its decision. kl 
C. Hauser's Drug-Use Just Prior To The Incident Was Relevant 
Evidence is admissible if "relevant to a material and disputed issue 
concerning the crime charged." State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 
217, 221 (2008) (quoting State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569, 165 P.3d 273, 283 
(2007)). Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable." I.RE. 401. "Whether a fact is material is 
determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties." 
State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 671, 227 P.3d 918, 925 (2010) (quoting 
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 143, 191 P.3d at 221). 
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In Johnson, the defendant was charged with lewd and lascivious conduct. 
148 Idaho 664, 227 P.3d 918. The trial court allowed evidence that, when 
confronted by his wife about the victim's allegations, Johnson told the victim 
"had walked in on him masturbating while watching pornography and became 
confused about what happened." kL at 670, 227 P.3d at 924. Johnson 
challenged the trial court's ruling on appeal. kL The Supreme Court found that 
Johnson's statements corroborated the wife's credibility and helped the jury 
understand her slow response to the victim's report of abuse. kL at 671, 227 
P.3d at 925. The statements were therefore relevant and admissible. kL 
In Stevens, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder of an 11-
month-old victim. 146 Idaho 139, 191 P.3d 217 (2008). At trial, the state moved , 
to introduce a video for use during the state's expert's testimony to explain "that 
[the victim's] injuries could not have resulted from a fall" down the stairs, 
Stevens' theory of the case. kL at 143, 192 P.3d at 221. Stevens objected on 
relevance grounds. kL The Supreme Court found that the video illustrated the 
expert's testimony which addressed the material issue before the jury - "whether 
Stevens caused [the victim's] injuries and death," or if "it was possible for [the 
victim's] injuries to have come from" a fall down stairs. Id. The Court thus 
concluded the video was relevant and admissible. kL 
Here, as in Johnson and Stevens, the evidence that Houser argues 
should have been excluded - Houser's drug-use just before the incident - was 
relevant to the parties' theories of the case. Houser's drug-use just before the 
incident tended to make Houser's assertions that he did not commit battery less 
8 
probable. It was therefore relevant to the material, disputed issue before the 
jury. 
Houser argues the evidence should have been excluded under LR. 
404(b), which prohibits use of prior bad acts as character-evidence, and to show 
action in conformity therewith in the crime now charged. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
13-16.) Exclusion of evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) "is based upon the theory that 
such evidence induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to have 
committed the charged crime because he or she is a person of bad character." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 14 (quoting State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 55, 855 P.2d 
891, 894 (Ct. App. 1993) (other citation omitted)).) See State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 
49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2009). By allowing such evidence, the court "thus 
takes the jury away from its primary consideration which is the defendant's guilt 
or innocence of the particular crime for which he or she is on trial." Shepherd, 
124 Idaho at 55, 855 P.2d at 894 (citing State v. Winkler, 112 Idaho 917, 919, 
736 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Ct. App. 1987)). 
Here, Hauser's drug-use just before the incident was not a prior bad act 
offered to show propensity to commit the crime now charged. The state offered 
the evidence to establish that Houser was under the continuing influence of 
drugs at the time of the battery. (Tr., p. 4, L. 21 - p. 5, L. 13.) As the prosecutor 
noted, Hauser's pre-incident drug-use would help explain Hauser's behaviors 
and condition during the incident and "set a[n] understanding for the jury." (Tr., 
p. 5, Ls. 5-13.) Accordingly, it did not take the jury away from its primary 
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consideration, but instead squarely addressed the issue before the jury -
Hauser's guilt or innocence of battery against Manning. 
The record and law thus support that the evidence of Houser's pre-
incident drug-use was relevant. 
D. The Magistrate Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion In Concluding The 
Probative Value Of Hauser's Pre-Incident Drug-Use Outweighed Any 
Prejudice, And In Allowing The Evidence's Admission 
In finding Hauser's pre-incident drug-use admissible, the magistrate court 
said, "I would certainly agree that any evidence of prior drug usage would be 
impermissible." (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 14-15.) Thus it is apparent the magistrate was 
aware he had discretion in ruling on Houser's motion in limine. The magistrate 
also distinguished State v. Boman, cited in Houser's supporting brief, noting that 
unlike in Boman, Houser "ma[de] an admission to consuming something recently 
that ha[d] an effect on [his] behavior" at the time of the crime charged. (Tr., p. 7, 
Ls. 15-25.) See State v. Boman, 123 Idaho 947, 854 P.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(evidence of defendant's drug addiction was not relevant to whether he 
committed crimes charged). The magistrate's comments reflect an exercise of 
reason, consistent with applicable law, and within the court's scope of discretion. 
See Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 P.3d at 590. Houser has therefore 
failed to show an abuse of discretion. 
E. Houser Has Failed To Show A Due Process Violation 
Where an error was objected-to at trial, the appellate courts apply a 
harmless error analysis. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227-28, 245 P.3d 961, 
979-80 (2010). Under that analysis, the defendant must first establish that a 
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violation has occurred, then the state has the burden of showing beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not contribute to the jury's 
verdict. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Here, as already discussed, Houser has 
failed to meet his initial burden. Having failed to show error or abuse of 
discretion in the magistrate's ruling about Hauser's pre-incident drug-use, Houser 
cannot establish a due process violation. Accordingly, this Court should reject 
Hauser's constitutional challenge. 
11. 
Houser Has Failed To Show Error In The Magistrate's Determination That 
Manning's Prior Self-Reported Misadministration Of Patient Medication, And The 
Details Of The Hospital's Code Gray Policy Were Not Relevant To Whether 
Houser Committed Battery 
A. Introduction 
Before trial, the state moved to exclude evidence of a past disciplinary 
action against Manning, and to exclude the hospital's policy manual outlining 
how hospital staff should respond to "disruptive, aggressive, or combative 
patients." (R., pp. 36-39.) The magistrate found the evidence of Manning's 
disciplinary action was irrelevant to Hauser's criminal case and excluded it. (Tr., 
p. 54, L. 22 - p. 55, L. 4.) The magistrate also ruled that the jury could hear 
about the hospital's Code Gray policy and its "general parameters," but that he 
would not allow "a trial on whether or not [Manning] should ... have [received] 
disciplinary action." (Tr., p. 62, Ls. 3-20.) At trial and in closing, defense counsel 
questioned whether Manning adhered to the Code Gray policy, but did not allow 
questioning about whether Manning could have been reprimanded for violating it. 
(See Tr., p. 136, L. 16 - p. 137, L. 9; p. 347, Ls. 1-5.) 
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Houser contends the magistrate's rulings were in error because the 
evidence was relevant as proper impeachment. (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-19.) 
Houser thus asserts he was denied right to confront witnesses and have a 
full and fair trial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-23.) Houser failed to sufficiently 
articulate his theory or present an adequate offer of proof that Manning's prior 
disciplinary action demonstrated motive for Manning to lie about Hauser's 
battery. Thus, Houser has failed to show the magistrate court abused its 
discretion in excluding the evidence, and whether Manning followed hospital 
policy in responding to the battery was not admissible. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court directly reviews a decision by a district court made in 
its appellate capacity. Decker, 152 Idaho at 145, 267 P.3d at 732 (citation 
omitted). Relevance of evidence is reviewed de novo. State v. Zichko, 129 
Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996); State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 
632, 945 P.2d 1, 3 (1997). Whether the probative value of evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under I.RE. 403 is a 
discretionary matter that will be disturbed on appeal only if the appellant 
demonstrates that the district court abused its discretion. State v. Enno, 119 
Idaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624 (1991 ); State v. Birkla, 126 Idaho 498, 500, 
887 P.2d 43, 45 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. Manning's Prior Disciplinary Action Was Not Relevant 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
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less probable." i.R.E. 401. The credibility of a witness is a fact of consequence, 
so impeachment evidence is always relevant. State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 
503, 988 P.2d 1170, 1177 (1999) (quoting State v. Arledge, 119 Idaho 584, 588, 
808 P.2d 1329, 1333 (Ct. App. 1991)). Impeachment evidence can address a 
pertinent character trait of a witness. I.R.E. 404(a)(2). Evidence of prior wrongs 
or acts may also be admissible "as proof of motive" or intent. I.R.E. 404(b). But 
here, Manning's past disciplinary action was not relevant to an impeachable 
character trait, nor did it support a reasonable inference that Manning had a 
motive to lie about Hauser's battery. 
Objecting to the state's motion to exclude evidence of Manning's past 
disciplinary action, Houser argued he intended to offer it "to impeach the witness 
or question the witness's credibility" (R., p. 41 ), and to "question the motive or 
intent or the reason for ... [Manning] to be testifying here today," but "not as our 
case in chief' (Tr., p. 53, L. 16 - p. 54, L. 3). Houser argues that the 
magistrate's ruling prevented him "from exploring Mr. Manning's material 
financial interest in his version of the event and the outcome of the case." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 20.) Houser asserts that "only two years before[, Manning] 
had almost been fired for a violation of the hospital's policies," thus the evidence 
of the prior disciplinary action was "highly relevant to how credible Mr. Manning's 
testimony was." (Appellant's brief, p. 20.) Hauser's assertions are unsupported 
by the record. 
There is no dispute as to the extent of the excluded evidence, which 
consisted of a "disciplinary action report," detailing "a 2010 employment 
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disciplinary proceeding" for Manning. (R., p. 38.) The state's summary of the 
document, unobjected-to by Houser, provided: 
Manning administered an incorrect medication to a patient. 
Manning self-reported the error. Subsequently, [the hospital] 
created a plan of action that Manning was ordered to follow to 
reinstate his employment. Manning reinstated his employment 
without further incident. 
(R., p. 38.) This evidence is insufficient to support Hauser's theory of Manning's 
motivation to lie. First, the 2010 disciplinary action does not impeach Manning's 
honesty; the fact that Manning self-reported his misadministration of medication 
supports the opposite. 
Second, the proffered facts do not support that Manning "had almost been 
fired," as opposed to following a routine reinstatement process after an instance 
of inadvertent human error. Houser made no offer of additional proof to support 
his speculative theory that Manning's employment status had been, or continued 
to be, in jeopardy as a result of his 2010 disciplinary action. Given the facts 
before the magistrate court, the 2010 disciplinary action was too far removed in 
time and too factually dissimilar from Hauser's battery of Manning to have any 
relevance. In other words, the 2010 disciplinary action did not tend to make a 
fact of consequence to Hauser's action more or less probable. I.RE. 401. The 
potential for confusion raised by a mini-trial about Manning's employment history 
outweighed any probative value from that evidence. See State v. Araiza, 124 
Idaho 82, 90-91, 856 P.3d 872, 880-81 (1993) (inquiries into collateral issues at 
trial "may be overly time-consuming and confusing to the jury," addressing I.R.E. 
608(b), regarding use of extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness). Houser has 
failed to show the magistrate court erred or abused its discretion in concluding 
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Manning's disciplinary action should be excluded. See Shackelford, 150 Idaho 
at 363, 247 P.3d at 590. 
D. The Record Supports That Whether Manning Possibly Violated The 
Hospital's Code Gray Policy Was Irrelevant, And That Ultimately, 
Exclusion Of The Issue Did Not Affect The Outcome Of Hauser's Trial 
As articulated by Hauser's counsel, the hospital's policy provides that 
hospital staff "call a Code Gray for assistance ... when they have a combative 
or aggressive ... patient." (Tr., p. 58, Ls. 12-17.) As part of that policy, 
"physical restraint and physical ... , intervention is a last resort." (Tr., p. 58, Ls. 
19-20.) Houser argues he should have been permitted to explore a theory that 
Manning lied about Houser battering him because Manning feared adverse 
employment action for violating the policy's admonition to use physical restraint 
as "a last resort." (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-21; see Tr., p. 58, L. 16 - p. 59, Ls. 
22.) 
As already discussed, Hauser's theory was supported by his theory alone. 
There was simply no evidence, nor a proffer of evidence, before the magistrate 
that Manning's employment status was actually at risk as a result of the 2010 
disciplinary action or the incident with Houser. (See Tr., p. 53, L. 16 - p. 54, L. 3; 
Appellant's brief, p. 20.) There was no showing that Manning's employment was 
at risk, or that he feared it was at risk, such that he had a motivation to lie about 
Houser's battery. Hauser's theory was far too speculative to warrant a time-
consuming, potentially confusing mini-trial as to the collateral issue of Manning's 
employment. See Araiza, 124 Idaho at 90-91, 856 P.3d at 880-81. 
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Even if this Court finds that the issue of Manning's adherence to the Code 
Gray policy was relevant to the issue of his credibility, the exclusion of the 
evidence was harmless. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 227-28, 245 3d at 979-80. 
The record, including Hauser's own testimony, supports beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Houser committed battery upon Manning. 
Manning testified that, as he helped put Hauser's shoe on, Houser "kicked 
up at [him]," threw his other shoe at Manning, "and said, 'Ow, you f'n bastard. 
I've got blisters on my feet."' (Tr., p. 97, Ls. 18-22.) Manning testified that 
Houser then "sat up off the bed, slid over and struck me in the face." (Tr., p. 97, 
Ls. 24-25.) After Manning told him to calm down, Houser "took another swing .. 
. [then] rolled back on the bed and started kickin' at [Manning]." (Tr., p. 98, Ls. 1-
3.) Manning then called a Code Gray, to indicate to fellow staff that he was 
dealing with a violent patient. (Tr., p. 100, Ls. 17-19.) 
Spoon testified he ran down to the room and "saw Greg Manning ... at 
the head of the bed." (Tr., p. 148, L. 17; p. 149, L. 22.) Spoon continued, 
"[Manning] appeared to be on his knees, and he had control of Mr. Hauser's left 
hand. I saw Mr. Houser kicking his legs and attempting to strike uh, Mr. Manning 
in the face." (Tr., p. 149, L. 23 - p. 150, L. 1.) Spoon testified that, after security 
guards came, Houser started to calm down, saying, "I'm done, I'm done, I'm 
done." (Tr., p. 152, Ls. 4-15.) 
In a video recorded by Officer Kelly when the officer approached Houser 
soon after the incident, the following exchange took place: 
Officer: Good morning. 
Houser: Good morning. 
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Officer: 
Houser: 
Officer: 
Houser: 
Officer: 
Houser: 
Officer: 
Houser: 
Houser: 
How's it goin'? 
(inaudible) ... 
Why are you tied down? 
(inaudible) ... we had a little scruffles. 
A little scruffle? What was that about? 
(inaudible) ... puttin' on my shoe and he didn't know 
there was a blister down there. 
Somebody was puttin' on your shoe and -
Yes. 
He was putting' on my shoe and he caught a blister. 
He didn't know it was down there, and I yelled and it 
scared him and came at me. He didn't know whether 
I was yellin' at him or yellin' (inaudible) ... 
(Tr., p. 188, L. 16 - p. 189, L. 13.) The officer also testified Houser "didn't 
specifically remember uh, striking or kicking Greg Manning, but I um - I seem to 
recall that he said it was possible or it could have happened." (Tr., p. 191, Ls. 5-
8.) The officer added, "he seemed remorseful for what happened, sorry it 
happened ... I don't remember the exact quote, but it was somethin' along the 
lines, that if it did happen that he was sorry. And um, uh, again he was 
emotional at the time but just sorry that it happened if he did in fact kick him." 
(Tr., p. 191, Ls. 11-18.) 
Also, emergency physician Paul Paschall testified that one "who has 
recently used methamphetamines and are still intoxicated on the 
methamphetamine . . . tend to be paranoid, agitated, confused at times, 
sometimes totally psychotic and not makin' any sense, and they can be violent 
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. . . stem[ming] more from their hallucinations and their paranoia than any 
physical intent." (Tr., p. 313, ls. 7-15.) When asked about telling Officer Kelly 
that he might have kicked Manning, Houser testified 
At the time I - I was giving Manning the benefit of the doubt. 
Maybe I could have kicked him. Maybe I - You know, at that state I 
was - you know, I was (inaudible) ... drugs. I - At that point I was 
questioning myself. You know, Could I have kicked him? Could I 
have - Could that have made contact? It - Maybe it could have. I 
mean maybe - In actuality, maybe that could have, but uh, all the 
other facts that uh, are in this situation, no, I did not kick Mr. 
Manning, uh, I did not hit Mr. Manning in no way, shape or form. 
That foot, it is possible, but I'm pretty confident that my foot did not 
hit him. 
(Tr., p. 278, L. 18 - p. 279, L. 4. 2) When asked if he was still affected by 
methamphetamines at the time that was happening, Houser testified, "Oh, I think 
I was affected by the - I think I still am affected by those methamphetamines." 
(Tr., p. 279, ls. 8-9.) 
The testimonies, particularly Hauser's, support the jury's verdict that 
Houser was guilty of battery against Manning. Even if defense counsel had been 
permitted to explore whether Manning violated the Code Gray policy - ostensibly 
because he could have left the room instead of restraining Houser - such 
exploration would not have affected the outcome of trial. Accordingly, Hauser's 
assertions of error and constitutional violations fail. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 227-
28, 245 P.3d at 979-80. (Appellant's brief, pp. 22-23.) 
2 Also, Houser testified about the kicking that he "had time to control my 
reaction," stating that he "aimed it away from [Manning]." (Tr., p. 277, l. 7 - p. 
278, L. 7.) Houser acknowledged he could have kept from kicking at all. (Tr., p. 
278, ls. 8-11.) 
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111. 
Houser Has Failed To Show Prosecutorial Misconduct In Eliciting Testimony 
From A Witness About Manning's Appearance At Trial, Which Testimony Was, 
In Any Event Harmless 
A. Introduction 
Houser asserts that the prosecution committed misconduct in eliciting 
testimony from a witness that Manning was wearing a sling at trial. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 24-29.) Hauser's argument fails because he cannot show that the 
prosecution's question was improper, or that it had any effect on his trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A defendant is not entitled to relief based upon a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct unless he can establish two things: (1) the complained of conduct 
was improper; and (2) the improper conduct prejudiced him. State v. Romero-
Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 202, 75 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Ct. App. 2003). Even after a 
finding of prosecutorial misconduct, a conviction will not be set aside for small 
errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results of 
the trial. See State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 367-68, 972 P.2d 737, 745-46 (Ct. 
App. 1998). "The right to due process does not guarantee a defendant an error-
free trial but a fair one." State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 1002, 
1008 (Ct. App. 1991 ). Similarly, the function of appellate review is "not to 
discipline the prosecutor for misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct 
did not interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial." 1st If the jury would 
have reached the same result had the prosecutor's error not occurred, the error 
is deemed harmless. b:i. 
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C. Houser Has Failed To Establish Prosecutorial Misconduct Or That The 
Outcome Of His Trial Was Affected By The Prosecutor's Question About 
Manning's Appearance At Trial 
Houser challenges the prosecutor's question of Craig Spoon, "Was there 
anything descriptive about [Manning] today, anything standing out about his 
appearance today that would help identify him?" (Tr., p. 153, Ls. 22-24.) 
Manning was a witness at trial, just before Spoon. (Tr., pp. 80-141.) Spoon's 
answer was, "His arm injury." (Tr., p. 153, L. 25.) Houser argues the 
"prosecutor's only possible motivation ... was to emphasize [Manning's] injury to 
the jury in order to arouse sympathy and have the jury identify with Mr. Manning." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 26.) The hyperbole of Houser's characterization is self-
evident Any arousal of sympathy extended no further than the jury's own 
perceptions of Manning's appearance. 
Houser also points out that the prosecutor asked Officer Kelly about 
Manning's injuries from the incident. (Appellant's brief, p. 26.) Houser was 
charged with battery. Injuries suffered by Manning due to the altercation with 
Houser are directly at issue before the jury. Houser has not demonstrated the 
prosecutors' questions were in any way improper. 
"An error is harmless if the reviewing court is able to declare beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict." State v. 
Marmentini, 152 Idaho 269, _, 270 P.3d 1054, 1057 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 219-220, 245 P.3d 961, 971-972 (2010)). Even if 
this Court found the prosecutor's question amounted to misconduct, Houser has 
not shown it had any impact on the outcome of his case. By highlighting the 
obvious, the prosecutor's question likely did little to advance the state's case, let 
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alone to adversely affect the outcome of Houser's. Accordingly, this Court 
should reject Hauser's arguments. 
IV. 
Hauser's Miscellaneous Assertions Of Prosecutorial Misconduct Are 
Waived, Thus The Court Need Not Consider Hauser's Proposal To Modify Perry 
Houser lists a string of instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct 
"almost all of [which] went without an objection." (Appellant's brief, pp. 26-27 
(identifying one instance when an objection was raised but overruled).) 
However, Houser offers no authority to support that any of the prosecution's 
listed actions was misconduct. Instead, presuming misconduct in each instance, 
Houser argues, "The Court should hold in a case where a long string of 
uninterrupted misconduct has deprived the defendant of a fair trial the case 
should be reversed regardless of whether his counsel objected." (Appellant's 
brief, p. 27.) Houser thus invites the Court to "modif[y Perry] such that in cases 
involving multiple incidents of prosecutorial misconduct that went without an 
objection . . . , an appellate court should review all the alleged misconduct to 
determine whether a fair trial was provided." (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a "party waives an issue cited on 
appeal if either authority or argument is lacking." Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 
P.3d at 970. Because Houser offered no argument or authority to support the 
assertions of misconduct, the (mostly unobjected-to) misconduct allegations are 
waived. Accordingly, the Court need not accept Hauser's invitation to modify 
Perry, based on the unsupported allegations. (Appellant's brief, pp. 26-29.) 
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V. 
Houser Has Failed To Establish Error, Let Alone Cumulative Error 
"The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when 
there is an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be 
harmless, but when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in 
contravention of the defendant's constitutional right to due process." State v. 
Draper, 151 Idaho 576,594,261 P.3d 853,871 (2011) (citations, quotations and 
alteration omitted). A necessary predicate to application of the cumulative error 
doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 
958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Also, cumulative error analysis does not include 
errors neither objected-to nor found fundamental. Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 
P.3d at 982. Houser asserts any errors individually deemed harmless mandate 
reversal here as cumulative error. (Appellant's brief, pp. 29-30.) However, 
Houser has failed to show any error, much less two or more errors. Thus, the 
doctrine of cumulative error does not apply. See, .sL.9..:., LaBelle v. State, 130 
Idaho 115,121,937 P.2d 427,433 (Ct. App. 1997). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
appellate decision. 
DATED this 6th day of June, 2014. 
~~~-
Deputy Attorney General 
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